A road to trust by Labonne, Julien & Chase, Robert S.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4706























































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
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The authors explore the relationship between transaction 
costs and generalized trust. Using panel data from 2,100 
households in 135 rural communities of the Philippines, 
the paper shows that where transaction costs are reduced 
(proxied by road construction), there is an increase in 
generalized trust. Consistent with the argument that 
This paper—a product of the Social Development Department, Sustainable Development Network—is part of a larger 
effort in the department to understand the determinants of both formal and informal social capital. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at jlabonne@
worldbank.org and rchase@worldbank.org. 
generalized trust is built through repeated interactions, 
the authors find that the individuals most likely to 
engage in exchange exhibit an increase in trust after road 
construction. These results suggest that, rather than being 
an input to economic growth, trust might be a product of 
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It is often argued that, ceteris paribus, exchange is more frequent in more trusting 
countries and communities as there is less need for costly enforcement mechanisms. 
Consistent with this argument, generalized trust (i.e., of people in general) has been 
shown to positively impact a wide range of economic phenomena. Countries with higher 
levels of generalized trust tend to, among others, experience higher rates of GDP growth 
(Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak and Knack 2001), have better institutions (La Porta et al. 
1997), and be less corrupt (Uslaner 2002). Similarly, public goods are more widely 
available and better maintained in more trusting communities (Ostrom 2000).  
 
In light of those findings, researchers have become interested in the determinants of 
trust.
2 A first school of thought treats trust as a predetermined characteristic and focuses 
on historical factors, such as religion and ethnic diversity to explain variation in trust 
levels. Cross-country regressions indicate that generalized trust tends to be lower in 
countries where hierarchical religions are dominant. Similarly, in more ethnically diverse 
countries and communities, trust is lower (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Leigh 2006).   
 
A second school of thought acknowledges that trust is not stable through time and has 
looked at the role of social and market interactions in building trust (Bohnet and Huck 
                                                 
2 This is especially important since, as noted by Sobel (2002), there is still some confusion between the 
causes and consequences of so-called ‘social capital’.  
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2004). For example, Glanville and Paxton (2007) argue that: “encounters with persons 
who do not share one’s sociodemographic characteristics could be particularly important 
in gauging how much to trust people in general.” This is consistent with the argument 
that the spread of television (i.e., an increase in the opportunity cost of time) erodes trust 
levels (Putnam 2000 and Olken 2006). Further, this might explain why suburbanization 
was responsible for part of the decline in social capital (trust being one of its 
components) in America (Putnam 2000), as it increases the cost of participating in social 
activities. Recent evidence from trust games suggests that trade frequency positively 
influences trust (Henrich et al. 2001; Huck et al. 2006). Following this line of argument, a 
potential avenue for building generalized trust is to increase both social and market face-
to-face interactions with people outside one’s immediate circle. This could be achieved 
by reducing costs associated with those activities.  
 
In this paper we analyze the relationship between a reduction in transaction costs and 
generalized trust. We use road construction as a proxy for reduction in transaction costs. 
We improve upon previous research on the determinants of trust by using panel data 
collected from 2,100 households in 135 rural communities of the Philippines in 2003 and 
2006. As a result, we provide more reliable estimates by controlling for household and 
community fixed-effects in all regressions. It is important to note that our sample covers 
some of the poorest municipalities in some of the poorest provinces of the Philippines. 
About 72 percent of the sampled households were engaged in farming in 2003. Thus, our 
results should be interpreted as the role of reduced transaction cost on trust at the initial 
stages of development. Further, the Philippines is a very low trust environment. In 2001, 
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only 8.4 percent of Filipinos declare trusting people in general.
3 Among the countries for 
which similar data is available, only two countries (Brazil and Lesotho) have lower levels 
of generalized trust. For comparison, in neighboring Indonesia 41.7 percent of individuals 
declare trusting others. 
 
Our analysis shows that road building is associated with an increase in generalized trust. 
The most conservative estimate indicates that building a road is associated with a 4.5 
percentage point (62.5 percent of the baseline mean) increase in generalized trust. Those 
results are robust to allowing for selection on observables. There is, however, no 
relationship between road construction and bonding trust (i.e., towards community 
members), presumably because roads increase interaction with outsiders, but they have 
no effect on the ease of interaction with community members. While we cannot directly 
test if increased interactions led to more trust, we show that access to markets improved 
in villages in which a road was built. Further, we find that, after road construction, 
individuals most likely to engage in exchange have larger increases in trust levels. 
 
Our evidence suggests that the current literature on the positive impact of trust on growth 
might have overlooked the potential endogeneity of trust. Indeed, road construction 
(which generates reductions in transaction costs) promotes both growth and trust-building 
interactions. This is consistent with findings from Indonesia where, over the period 1985-
1997, industrialization was associated with stronger social networks (Miguel et al. 2006).  
 
                                                 
3 Data retrieved from http://www.worldvaluesurvey.org (accessed on 04/02/2008). 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some hypotheses on the 
determinants of trust. Section 3 describes the datasets used. General results are presented 
in Section 4. Section 5 explores empirically mechanisms through which roads increase 
trust. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Formation of Trust 
 
Theoretically, the links between trust and growth are constrained by the way one assumes 
how trust is built. If one treats trust as a predetermined characteristic, trust cannot be 
affected by growth and the causal link (if any) goes from more trust to more growth. 
However, if one acknowledges the role of interaction in building trust, growth can 
promote trust (or at least factors generating growth can also lead to more trust).   
 
We now briefly discuss some testable hypotheses that arise from assuming that trust is 
built through interactions. Individuals live in a country composed of communities and 
various socioeconomic groups. We assume that one can easily distinguish between 
members of the various groups and that diversity is more pronounced between than 
within communities. 
  
Trust is built through interactions. Specifically, trust toward a given group goes up with 
the number of face-to-face interactions with members of that group. An individual 
generalized trust level is equal to the (weighted) average of trust toward the different 
socioeconomic groups. The same applies to trust toward community members. 
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Individuals engage in face-to-face trade both with members of their community and 
individuals living in neighboring communities. Trade with the latter category is 
constrained by the transaction cost of interactions between the two communities. Thus, a 
reduction in transaction cost between two communities will lead to an increase in trade. 
As a result, having assumed that diversity is more pronounced between than within 
communities, individuals will engage in exchange with member of groups with which 
they have no prior history of interactions. This will build generalized trust.  
 
Available evidence indicates that rural roads might lead to more interactions. In Vietnam, 
rural road construction and rehabilitation had a positive impact on both the presence and 
the frequency of markets (Mu and Van de Walle, 2007). Further, in Bangladesh, rural 
roads led to significant savings of household transport expenses (Khandker et al. 2006). 
Some evidence also suggests that rural roads positively affect consumption through 
higher wages and higher output prices. Those impacts might take longer to materialize, 
however.   
 
3. The Setting and the Data 
3.1. The Data 
 
We use a panel dataset that was collected in rural communities of the Philippines in the 
fall of 2003 and 2006. The sample covers 2,100 households in 135 villages (in 16 
municipalities) of the Philippines. The data was collected for the impact evaluation of a 
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development project which targets resources to the poorest municipalities in the poorest 
provinces of the Philippines (Chase and Holmemo 2005). 
 
We have information on whether each respondent trusts people in general (generalized 
trust) and trusts people in their village (bonding trust). The questions are similar to the 
usual World Value Survey question
4 : “In general do you agree or disagree with the 
following statement: most people can be trusted.” We follow Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2002) and classify individuals answering “agree somewhat” or “agree strongly” as 
trusting. Others are classified as being non-trusting. With this distinction, only 7.2 
percent of individuals declared trusting strangers while 58 percent declared trusting 
members of their community in 2003.
5 
 
Information is available on the households’ poverty status. We use information on asset 
ownership to build an asset index which serves as a measure of wealth (asset). We also 
use data on the highest level of schooling achieved by the household head (No Edu, 
Primary, Secondary, College) and on whether the household is engaged in farming 
(Farmer HH). Further, we have information on the religion and ethnic group of the 
household head.  We aggregate this information at the village-level to obtain the 
following village estimates: measures of ethnic diversity and of inequality, the share of 
                                                 
4 Responses to trust questions are correlated with real-life financial decisions (Karlan 2005) but there are 
some debates as to whether they measure trust or trustworthiness. Indeed, self-reported trust levels have 
been shown to be correlated with the second player behavior (i.e. trustworthiness) in a trust game but not 
always with the first player behavior (i.e. trust) in this game (Glaeser et al. 2000, Holm and Danielson 
2005).  However, recent findings from trust games suggest that behavior from the first player in a trust 
game does not necessarily capture trusting behavior but rather risk-aversion (Schechter 2007). 
5 Our village-level measures of trust are computed using the balanced panel of about 2,100 households. 
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households engaged in farming, the share who are Catholic, the share who are Muslim, 
and the average wealth and education levels in the community.  
 
In addition, information was collected from elected village officials on infrastructure 
construction
6 in the communities between 2003 and 2006. We use this data to generate a 
dummy equal to one if a road was built over the period. To test whether other types of 
development projects other than roads have similar effects, we also use a dummy equal to 
one if a water system was built over the period. From now on, we refer to villages in 
which a road was eventually constructed as “road villages” and the other as “non-road 
villages.”  
 
The roads considered are small rural roads (about 2km of length on average and usually 
in concrete) that represent major upgrades to existing dirt paths. They tend to be 
strategically located to deal with the segments that are either particularly treacherous or 
impassable during the rainy season. Indeed, a number of the villages in our sample were 
inaccessible by road at least for part of the year in 2003. Analysis of the first round of 
data indicates that only 56 percent of households were accessible by road all year long 




                                                 
6 Despite the trend towards greater participation of communities, decision-making is sill controlled by local 
governments. This problem is especially acute for large projects such as roads since communities do not 
have access to the necessary financial and technical resources. 
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3.2. Where are roads constructed? 
 
We assess if prior to road construction, non-road villages in our sample were similar to 
road villages. This will help determine if what happened in those villages between 2003 
and 2006 provides good estimates of what would have happened in road-villages had a 
road not been constructed there (i.e., the counterfactual).  
 
A priori, one might expect road and non-road villages to differ before road construction. 
If more trusting communities are more likely to trade, roads will generate higher benefits, 
so these higher trust communities should be more likely to request a road. Alternatively, 
isolated communities are more likely to benefit from a road and thus to request one. 
Those communities might also be less likely to be trusting, as they had little opportunities 
to interact with others outside of their communities.  
 
We compare the 2003 distribution of generalized and bonding trust in road and non-road 
villages. Specifically, we test for equality of mean and equality of distribution using t and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. Results are presented in Table 1.  They indicate that non-
road villages provide an appropriate control group for road villages: there were no 
statistically significant differences between them in 2003. 
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We now turn our attention to broader determinants of the decision to construct a road. We 
regress a dummy, equal to one for road-villages, on a set of village characteristics
7 
measured in 2003 (to deal with concerns over endogeneity).  Regressions include 
municipal dummies. In addition, as standard errors might be correlated within a 
municipality, we compute standard errors robust to arbitrary covariance structure within 
municipalities. Results are presented in Table 2. The regressors do not jointly predict 
whether a road will be built in the village over the period (joint p-value from the OLS 
regression is 0.40).  
 
These results suggest few systematic differences between road and non-road villages in 
2003. This increases our confidence that non-road villages in our sample will provide 
unbiased estimates of the counterfactual. However, as a further robustness test we will 
also allow for selection on observables. 
 
4. Does Reducing Transaction Costs Enhance Generalized 
Trust? 
 
In this section, we explore the relationship between road construction and changes in 
generalized trust. Specifically, we compare the changes in trust levels between road and 
non-road villages over the period 2003-2006. Our estimation strategy relies on panel data, 
which allows us to control for community fixed-effects.  
                                                 
7 Share of households who are engaged in agricultural activities, whose head attended college or secondary 
school, whose head did not attend school, average wealth in the village and dummies for distance to 
municipal center. 
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The level   of generalized trust in village j in municipality k at time t (t=0,1) is 
determined by:  
jkt y
 
jkt kt jk jkt jkt jkt w v u Road X y + + + + = * * β α                                                               (1) 
 
where α  and β  are coefficients to be estimated,   is a vector of control variables that 
vary across villages and time,   is a dummy indicating the presence of a road 
linking village j to markets at time t,   is a common village-effect,   is a time effect 
common across all villages in municipality k at time t and,   is the usual idiosyncratic 
error term, assumed to be independent of  ,  , u  and  .  Following the 
literature on the determinants of trust, the set of control variables    includes a 
measure of ethnic diversity and of inequality, the share of households engaged in 
farming, the share who are Catholic, the share who are Muslims, and the average wealth 
and education levels in the community. All regressions include municipality dummies, 




u jk kt v
jkt
jkt w




                                                 
8 Cluster-robust standard errors are downward biased when the number of cluster is small (less than 
30).This might lead us to over-reject the null hypothesis of no effect. However, the village-level results 
presented here are consistent with the household-level results (in which we cluster standard errors at the 
village-level) discussed later. This increases our confidence in our results.  
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We estimate our equation above through first-differencing.
9 Specifically, we eliminate 
the time-constant unobservable u by differencing equation (1). After rewriting 
 and , we obtain:   ) ( 0 1 k k k v v c − = ) ( 0 1 jk jk jk w w d − =
 
jk k jk jk jk d c Road X y + + Δ + Δ = Δ * * β α                                                                     (2) 
 
where   and   are the change in the variables between t=0 and t=1. Results 
are presented in Columns 1-2 of Table 3. 
jk X Δ jk Road Δ
 
Road building is associated with an increase in generalized trust. The most conservative 
estimate indicates that building a road is associated with a 4.5 percentage-point increase 
in generalized trust. This represents 62.5 percent of the baseline mean (7.2 percent). 
Following our hypotheses, a potential explanation is that building roads increases 
interactions with outsiders, who most likely have different socioeconomic characteristics. 
Those interactions in turn increase trust. Trust is therefore not fully historically 
determined but also the product of recent experiences.  
 
A potential concern with our results is that they might capture mood effects associated 
with the benefits of receiving a development project rather than the benefits of being a 
road village.  Indeed, in villages in which a development project was implemented over 
the period 2003-2006, respondents might have a brighter outlook on life and thus might 
be more likely to respond positively to our trust questions. We use two strategies to test 
                                                 
9 With two time periods, the estimates are numerically identical to the fixed-effects (Wooldridge 2002). 
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for this possibility. First, we run the same regressions but replace our measure of 
generalized trust with a measure of bonding trust (Columns 3-4 in Table 3). Being a road-
village does not lead to any statistically significant effect on bonding trust.  This 
increases our confidence in our results. Indeed, if mood effects were responsible for the 
impact of road construction on generalized trust, it should also have an impact on 
bonding trust.  
 
Second, we assess if the results hold for another type of development projects. As a 
result, we run regressions as above but include (i) a dummy indicating whether a water 
system was built in the village over the three year period and (ii) the number of 
development projects implemented in the village between 2003 and 2006 (excluding 
water systems and roads). We decide to single out water systems since, like rural roads, 
they are very common projects in the sampled areas and are likely to generate large 
household-level benefits. Results are presented in Table 3.  There is no relationship 
between receiving a water project and generalized trust. A similar result is obtained with 
the number of development projects implemented in the village over the period. 
 
We now allow for selection on observables using a method proposed by Hirano et al. 
(2003). This method starts by estimating the propensity score  ) ( ~
0 jk X p  and then estimate 
equation (2) through Weighted Least Squares (WLS) with the weights being: 

















+ = ω . Results are presented in Column 3 of Table 3. Even when 
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we control for selection on observables road building is associated with an increase in 
generalized trust.  
 
We also run equation (2) at the household-level. By looking at the change between 2003 
and 2006 we are able to control for household-level fixed effects. All regressions include 
municipality dummies, and standard errors are robust to arbitrary covariance structure 
within villages. Results, available in Table 4, are consistent with village-level results. As 
a further test, we also control for trust levels in 2003 (to reduce concerns over regression 
towards the mean). Living in a road village still has a positive impact on trust levels. 
 
As described above, a local development project was implemented in about half of the 
sample villages between the two survey rounds. This might affect the results. Thus, we 
run equation (2) again and include a dummy indicating whether the development project 
was implemented in the village. Results are consistent with the ones obtained previously. 
 
5. Why Does Generalized Trust Increase? 
 
Having shown that generalized trust increases in road-villages, we now test if, consistent 
with our earlier hypotheses, this is because roads lead to more interactions. We intend to 
shed some light on those questions by assessing whether roads lead to (i) improved 
access to markets and (ii) more consumption. We run household-level regressions of the 
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determinants of change in access to markets
10 and in log monthly per capita 
consumption. All regressions include municipality dummies, and standard errors are 
robust to arbitrary covariance structure within villages. Results are available in Table 5.
While living in a road village does not affect per capita consumption, it has a positive 
impact on access to markets. This is consistent with the argument that road constructio
positively affects trust throu
 
n 
gh interactions.  
                                                
 
To further understand if increased interactions explain the impact of road construction on 
generalized trust, we now assess whose trust levels increases after road construction. To 
do so, we run household-level regressions of the determinants of changes in generalized 
trust (as in Table 4) and introduce interactions terms. Specifically we are interested in 
assessing whether farmers gain more than non farmers, more educated individuals gain 
more than less educated ones and wealthier individuals gain more than poorer ones.  We 
use data from 2003 to reduce endogeneity concerns. All regressions include municipality 
dummies and standard errors are robust to arbitrary covariance structure within villages. 
Results are available in Table 6. 
 
First, road construction has a positive impact on trust levels of farming households. No 
such result is obtained for households not engaged in farming. This is consistent with the 
argument that roads increase trust through increased interactions as farmers are most 
likely to benefit from increased access to markets. Second, when we look at the role of 
education in explaining the response to road construction, our results indicate that more 
 
10Our measure of access to markets is the response to the question “With respect to access to markets, 
would you say that you are better off now than three years ago? “ (worse off, same, better off) 
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educated individuals (those with secondary school education) are more likely to trust 
more. We do not find such an effect on individuals with some college education. This 




In this paper, we provide evidence that road construction is associated with increased 
trust levels. Using panel data on 135 communities in the Philippines, we show that in 
villages in which a road was built over the period 2003-2006, trust increased by 4.5 
percentage points. The magnitude of this coefficient is quite large given the very low 
levels of generalized trust in the Philippines. Further, our household-level results suggest 
that this impact manifests through increased interactions with people outside the 
community. In our setting, reduced transaction cost (i.e., road construction) are likely to 
lead to an increase in face-to-face interactions.  
 
Finally, our results suggest that the current literature on the positive impact of trust on 
growth might have overlooked the potential endogeneity of trust. Indeed, reduced 
transaction costs promote growth and our results indicate that they also build trust. 
Further research is needed to understand if higher trust comes from economic growth 
(generated by reducing transaction costs) or comes directly from reduced transaction 
costs.
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 Comparing road and non-road villages in 2003 
 Mean  T-test  Kolmogorov 




  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Generalized trust  0.0472  0.0787  1.49  0.167 
 (0.012)  (0.010)  [0.137]  [0.564] 
Bonding trust  0.5433  0.5868  1.25  0.240 
 (0.034)  (0.016)  [0.210]  [0.155] 








 Where are Roads Constructed? 
  OLS  Probit (Marginal Effects) 
 (1)  (2) 
Share in Agriculture  0.037  0.038 
 (0.219)  (0.129) 
Avg. Asset  -0.032  -0.029 
 (0.057)  (0.038) 
Share College  -0.088  -0.036 
 (0.451)  (0.492) 
Share Secondary School  0.653  0.483 
 (0.339)*  (0.207)* 
Share No Education  -0.323  -0.109 
 (0.463)  (0.292) 
Distance to town center (low)  -0.012  -0.006 
 (0.038)  (0.031) 
Distance to town center (medium) 0.133  0.087 
 (0.095)  (0.067) 
    
Municipal Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Observations 135  108 
Joint p-value  0.40   
R-squared 0.26  0.24  (pseudo) 
Note: Results from OLS (Column 1) and Probit (Column 2) regressions. The dependent variable is a 
dummy equal to one if a road was built in the village between 2003 and 2006. Marginal effects computed at 
the mean. The standard errors (in parentheses) are Huber-corrected and account for intra-municipal 
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Table 3 
 The Road to Trust – Village-level Results 
  D Generalized Trust  D Bonding Trust 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Road  0.045 0.051  0.050  -0.029 -0.026 
  (0.013)*** (0.013)***  (0.017)*** (0.051) (0.058) 
Water   0.024  0.026    -0.018 
   (0.014)  (0.015)    (0.040) 
Nb Projects     0.005  0.003    0.002 
   (0.006)  (0.006)    (0.012) 
D Share in Agriculture  0.027  0.025  0.028  -0.136  -0.132 
 (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.042)  (0.152)  (0.150) 
D Inequality  -0.057  -0.050  -0.066  0.068  0.062 
 (0.035)  (0.040)  (0.038)  (0.140)  (0.145) 
D Ethnic Diversity  0.004  0.027  0.073  -0.079  -0.063 
 (0.072)  (0.065)  (0.073)  (0.166)  (0.166) 
D Catholic  0.308  0.347  0.321  -0.183  -0.233 
 (0.173)*  (0.171)*  (0.170)*  (0.277)  (0.299) 
-0.685 -0.927  -1.038  0.885 0.786  D Islam 
(1.151) (1.081)  (1.227)  (2.913)  (3.015) 
D Wealth  0.007  0.007  0.003  0.021  0.017 
 (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.030)  (0.033) 
D Education  -0.004  -0.013  -0.009  -0.008  -0.008 
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.023)  (0.026) 
          
          
Municipal Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 135  133  133  135  133 
R-squared 0.49  0.52  0.51  0.19  0.20 
Note: Results from fixed-effects OLS (Column 1-2 and 4-5) WLS regressions (Column 3) . The 
dependent variable is the change (2003-2006) in the proportion of villagers who trust strangers (Column 1-
3).The dependent variable is the change (2003-2006) in the proportion of villagers who trust their 
neighbors (Column 4-5). The propensity score used to compute the weights for the WLS regression 
includes the control variables from Table 2. The standard errors (in parentheses) are Huber-corrected and 
account for intra-municipal correlation. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% and, *** at 
the 1%. 
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Table 4 
 The Road to Trust – Household-level Results 
  D Generalized Trust  D Bonding Trust 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Village-level Characteristics         
Road  0.057 0.056 0.025  -0.011 -0.005 
  (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.012)**  (0.040) (0.041) 
Water   0.021  0.000    -0.028 
   (0.019)  (0.011)    (0.038) 
Nb Projects    0.008  0.005    -0.007 
   (0.005)  (0.003)    (0.010) 
0.056 0.060 0.062  -0.136  -0.136  D Share in Agriculture 
 (0.071)  (0.073)  (0.041)  (0.125)  (0.124) 
D Inequality  -0.023  -0.029  0.004  0.087  0.082 
 (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.025)  (0.120)  (0.124) 
D Ethnic Diversity  -0.076  -0.048  -0.010  -0.055  -0.065 
 (0.076)  (0.079)  (0.045)  (0.150)  (0.146) 
D Catholic  0.220  0.241  0.173  -0.167  -0.224 
 (0.118)*  (0.119)**  (0.079)**  (0.277)  (0.276) 
D Islam  -0.973  -1.270  -0.606  1.318  1.510 
 (1.041)  (0.991)  (0.593)  (2.561)  (2.593) 
Household level Characteristics        
D Wealth  0.000  0.001  -0.002  -0.014  -0.014 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.008)*  (0.008) 
D Education  0.000  0.000  0.003  0.002  0.003 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
D age  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Generalized Trust (2003)      -0.978     
     (0.017)***     
          
Municipal Dummies  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 2041  2026  2026  2027  2012 
R-squared 0.07  0.08  0.68  0.02  0.02 
Note: Results from fixed-effects OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the household-level change 
(2003-2006) in generalized trust (Column 1-3). The dependent variable is the household-level change 
(2003-2006) in bonding trust. (Column 4-5). The standard errors (in parentheses) are Huber-corrected and 
account for intra-village correlation. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% and, *** at the 
1%. 
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Table 5 
Road Construction, Expenditures and Access to Markets 
  D ln(p.c. monthly cons)  Access Markets 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Road 0.003  0.017  0.098 0.113 
 (0.032)  (0.028)  (0.050)* (0.047)** 
D Wealth    0.050    0.012 
   (0.007)***    (0.010) 
D Age    0.000    0.009 
   (0.005)    (0.006) 
D HH size    -0.001    0.003 
   (0.002)    (0.002) 
D Edu    -0.128    -0.019 
   (0.007)***    (0.008)** 
D Land Owner    0.035    0.037 
   (0.022)    (0.032) 
      
Municipal Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 2067  2042  2067  2042 
R-squared 0.03  0.20  0.10  0.10 
Note: Results from fixed-effects OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the household-level change 
(2003-2006) in log monthly per capita consumption (Column 1 – 2) and in access to markets (Column 3 – 
4). The standard errors (in parentheses) are Huber-corrected and account for intra-village correlation. * 
denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% and, *** at the 1%. 




 Who Trusts More after Road Construction? 
  D Generalized Trust 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Road*Farmer HH  0.060    
  (0.019)***    
Road*Not Farmer HH  0.051     
 (0.032)     
Road*Secondary School    0.124   
   (0.035)***   
Road*College   0.052   
   (0.056)  
Road*Primary School    0.034   
   (0.024)  
Road*No Education    0.110   
   (0.079)  
Road*Wealth     -0.004 
     (0.007) 
      
Municipal Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 2026  2026  2026 
R-squared 0.08  0.08  0.08 
Note: Results from fixed-effects OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the household-level change 
(2003-2006) in generalized trust. All regressions include the set of explanatory variables in Column 2 of 
Table 4. Regressions also include a dummy indicating whether the household was engaged in farming in 
2003 (Column 1); dummies indicating the household head educational achievements in 2003 (Column 2) 
and, the road dummy and the level of household wealth in 2003 (Column 3).  The standard errors (in 
parentheses) are Huber-corrected and account for intra-village correlation. * denotes significance at the 
10% level, ** at the 5% and, *** at the 1%. 
 
 
 